"Black swan" of 2025: A Year of Upheaval, Freedom, and Hope for Belarus. Part II

Throughout 2025, the Belarusian economy appeared to maintain a surprising degree of resilience, as well as all the years after 2020. Despite the mounting weight of international sanctions and sustained pressure, the state initially posted respectable growth figures and saw a rise in average wages. However, as the year drew to a close, the country finally began to manifest as a tangible economic downturn — for the first time since 2020 and the introduction of sanctions. Curiously, this contraction was not the direct result of the specific sanctions targeting the Lukashenka administration, but rather a symptom of economic instability in Russia.

The deterioration of Belarus’s economic prospects was primarily driven by the rapid decline of the Russian economy. By the final months of 2025, Russia’s economic engine — strained by years of mobilization and militarization — began to stagnate, shifting from growth into a period of visible deceleration that had immediate repercussions for its neighbor.

This Russian slump is the result of several converging factors, chief among them unsustainable military expenditures and a weakening oil market. The Kremlin’s economy has reached a point where it can no longer adequately finance Putin’s invasion of Ukraine — by November 2025, GDP growth had stalled at just 0.1%. Furthermore, industrial production — which had effectively propped up Russia’s economic indicators through 2023 and 2024 — registered a contraction of 0.7%. This downturn is not a mere seasonal variation but a structural exhaustion of the "war-driven" growth model.

Despite these burgeoning economic crises, the Kremlin continues to pour billions into the war. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, military spending has reached a staggering $550 billion, according to data from the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine. To grasp the scale of this expenditure, it is equivalent to 24 annual Russian budgets for higher education or 22 years of healthcare funding. To sustain this, the Kremlin has obviously shifted the financial burden onto the civilian population through aggressive new taxes and rising prices.

Additionally, the Russian economy suffered a severe blow in 2025 from a combination of targeted energy sanctions and Ukrainian drone strikes on critical oil infrastructure. A systematic campaign against refineries, oil depots, and export terminals successfully reduced Russia’s refining capacity and slashed revenues while creating massive logistical bottlenecks.

Diplomatic pressure also reached a fever pitch throughout the year. In January 2025, the outgoing administration of President Joe Biden implemented a major sanctions package targeting the fuel and energy complex, specifically naming Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas. In February, the European Union approved its 16th sanctions package, banning the use of temporary storage for Russian oil on EU territory. By May, the 17th package targeted Surgutneftegaz and 189 vessels of the "shadow fleet." This was followed in July by the 18th package, which lowered the oil price cap, and finally, on October 23, the 19th package prohibited any operations with Rosneft and Gazprom Neft.

As a result, Russian crude exports fell sharply toward the end of 2025. Coupled with a collapse in global prices, this led to a disastrous reduction in earnings for Moscow. The combination of Ukrainian strikes and tightened Western sanctions drove the value of Russian seaborne supplies to their lowest levels since the invasion began in February 2022.

But how did a country without its own oil reserves become so inextricably tied to the volatility of the oil trade and the Russian market? That is perhaps a question best directed to Aliaksandr Lukashenka personally.

Regardless, 2025 has proved to be a watershed moment — the first year in which the true costs of war and sanctions have definitively marked the balance sheets of both Russia and Belarus.

The geopolitical trajectory of the Belarusian state continues its shift toward Moscow, as the country becomes increasingly tethered to Russia through a deepening web of political, economic, and military integration. Under the framework of the "Union State," Belarus has largely transitioned into a client state, a process that accelerated significantly following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This realignment is visible not only in high-level diplomacy but also in the daily functioning of the country, where Belarusian factories are now actively repurposed to support the Russian war effort and state infrastructure is routinely placed at the disposal of Russian military personnel.

This institutional shift is mirrored by a rapid and aggressive campaign of russification and militarization across all sectors of Belarusian society. In the media and education systems, the Kremlin’s pro-war narratives have become the standard, particularly targeting the younger generation. In schools, students are now required to attend "patriotism classes" where they are lectured by Russian soldiers and exposed to "Wagner museums" that glorify the paramilitary group’s activities. At the same time, Russia’s soft power has expanded through thousands of Rossotrudnichestvo scholarships, offering Belarusians educational paths that are increasingly the only ones available. As borders with Europe tighten and Western visa access shrinks, the resulting asymmetry of opportunity is steadily pulling Belarusian youth further into the Russian cultural and professional orbit.

Demographically, the landscape is also changing as an increasing number of Russian citizens, including military families and business owners, relocate to Belarus to purchase real estate and enterprises. This influx has been accompanied by the granting of Belarusian citizenship to Russian militants, a move that further erodes the traditional boundaries of national identity.

Yet, despite this state-led push for integration, public opinion remains complex and often resistant. While state media aggressively promotes the war, internal polling suggests a resilient anti-war consensus among the majority of Belarusians. Many fear the conflict spilling across their borders and strongly oppose direct military participation, even as the country's territory remains a critical staging ground for Russian operations.

The most physical manifestation of this integration arrived in late December 2025 with the deployment of the Oreshnik intermediate-range missile system. President Alexander Lukashenka confirmed that up to ten of these systems would be stationed in Belarus, placing nuclear-capable weapons with a range of up to 5,500 kilometers on the doorstep of several NATO member states. While the Kremlin touts the Oreshnik as an interception-proof “superweapon,” Western experts remain skeptical, viewing the deployment more as a political signal than a technical breakthrough. Regardless of the weapon's actual efficacy, its presence on Belarusian soil underscores a grim new reality — the country has become a permanent forward military platform for Russia and a missile launchpad, signalling a total convergence of the two nations' security architectures.

Another event of 2025 that it’s actually not worth mentioning, is the so-called "presidential election”. In January 2025, Belarus conducted a political performance that independent observers and the democratic opposition characterized as a meticulously choreographed sham. Alexander Lukashenka secured his seventh term with a declared result of 86.82% — a testament to the regime's total control over the electoral apparatus. Unlike the uprising of 2020, the 2025 vote was managed as a "special operation" in loyalty enforcement. This time Lukashenka took zero risks and no genuine alternative candidates were permitted to register. Potential disruptors were preemptively detained months in advance, and the regime pointedly declined to invite the OSCE and independent observers to monitor, ensuring a vacuum of independent oversight.

This predetermined outcome has effectively reinforced a political status quo where no organized democratic challenge can exist within the country's borders, and systemic repression remains the primary tool of governance. The announcement by the purged Central Election Commission served as the final act in a campaign designed to eliminate risk. With the constitutionalized All-Belarusian People’s Assembly now serving as a secondary layer of regime insurance, the nomenklatura has solidified its stake in the current order, creating a rigid structure that prizes loyalty over legitimacy and leaves the civic space almost entirely closed.

Regarding domestic policy, the regime has undergone a transformation, evolving from an authoritarian model into a totalitarian one. This shift has been driven by the systematic intensification of repression, as well as increasing militarization and ideological control. A key development in this process was the adoption of Presidential Directive No. 12 on April 9, 2025, titled "On the Implementation of the Foundations of the Ideology of the Belarusian State," which formally entrenched the regime's ideology as the sole permissible worldview.

The year 2025 also saw various functional shifts and horizontal personnel rotations within the state apparatus. These maneuvers, which resulted in no substantive change to the status of officials, served primarily to mimic genuine democratic processes. The most interesting and memorable internal shift was undoubtedly the fact that the Belarusian KGB has officially taken over the functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spearheading efforts to "normalize" relations with the West and the United States. This unprecedented move, where a security service is tasked with international diplomacy, speaks volumes about the current state of the country and the priorities of the ruling power.

The plight of Belarusian migrants and the democratic opposition in exile has deteriorated in 2025. Migration policies and the general treatment of Belarusian refugees continue to harden as European nations prioritize "securitization" in response to growing fears of a potential Russian invasion of the EU or an attack on NATO territories. Consequently, the mobility of Belarusians has been severely restricted, and the legal landscape for those seeking residency has become increasingly difficult. In a troubling shift, Belarusian activists are now frequently viewed through the lens of national security risks rather than as political refugees seeking sanctuary.

As previously noted, funding for Belarus’s civil sector and political structures in exile has plummeted. This financial drought is not solely the result of severed American funding but also stems from a sharp reduction in aid from European partners, driven by shifting priorities and domestic economic constraints. Compounding these challenges, the regime in Minsk has aggressively leveraged diplomatic channels, making the cessation of support for the democratic opposition a recurring condition in its interactions with the West.

This geopolitical pivot is perhaps most visible in Lithuania. Beyond the mass designation of ordinary Belarusians as "threats to national security" and subsequent forced departures, a symbolic turning point occurred in the autumn of 2025. It was revealed that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office had been stripped of state protection and is now forced to relocate. This move has not yet been fully officially confirmed, but is highly likely in 2026. While it is officially framed as a security necessity, the political undertones of the decision are undeniable.

The influence of the Belarusian democratic forces on both domestic and foreign policy is stagnating, with support levels flatlining among both the population inside the country and the pro-democracy diaspora. Time is proving to be an adversary for the exiled political elite; as the gap between the leadership in exile and the general population widens, their leverage to protect the interests of Belarusians abroad continues to diminish.

Yet, despite this perceived "weakness" and the erosion of their standing, the Belarusian democratic movement abroad remains a profound source of anxiety and irritation for the regime — and for Aliaksandr Lukashenka personally. Even five years later, the shadow of the opposition looms large. This obsession was on full display at the All-Belarusian People's Assembly, where Lukashenka dedicated nearly his entire address to the subject of protest migrants and democratic forces, even appearing defensive as he justified the release of political prisoners to his audience. The speech revealed a dictator who monitors the agenda of the democratic movement with an intensity that surpasses even that of many activists within the movement itself. It is a stark reminder that the trauma of 2020 continues to haunt him, refusing to let go.

Internally, the democratic movement faces a complex new challenge — the re-emergence of influential political heavyweights recently released from prison. These figures are not directly competing with S. Tsikhanouskaya and her team, but often propose strategies that fundamentally contradict the course charted by the exiled political structures over the past five years. While these liberated leaders have largely avoided open warfare with the established elite in exile, they have not shied away from criticism, leading to periodic public friction. The most dramatic instance of this tension has been the scandal between Tsikhanouskaya’s office and her own husband, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, who was released from prison on June 21, 2025.

For the moment, the opposition leadership is attempting to temper this internal criticism to avoid projecting an image of fragmentation—a weakness the regime would be eager to exploit. However, the political landscape of the Belarusian opposition in 2026 remains a complete unknown, particularly with the anticipated release of key figures such as Maria Kalesnikava and Viktar Babaryka.

As previously noted, Lithuania has undergone a significant shift in its policy toward Belarusians. However, the Baltic nation has itself become the target of sophisticated hybrid attacks orchestrated by the Lukashenka regime — a crisis exacerbated by its own controversial political decisions.

On October 30, 2025, Lithuania unilaterally shut its entire border with Belarus due to the national security threat posed by a swarm of meteorological balloons carrying contraband cigarettes, which paralyzed operation of Vilnius Airport, affecting thousands of passengers. However, Lithuanian authorities forgot a small detail on the other side of the border — about 2,000 Lithuanian trucks. These vehicles were carrying goods from Central Asian countries, Russia and China to the EU and back, and got stuck in Belarus. While a few managed to slip through before a total blockade was enforced on November 10, 1,818 trucks were effectively trapped inside Belarus.

The Belarusian side, and Lukashenka in person, were absolutely outraged by Lithuania's decision, which also disrupted the deal between the Belarusian regime and Poland, which was about to open its borders with Belarus. Customs authorities herded the stuck vehicles into holding zones operated by Beltamozhservice — a sanctioned state entity — charging fees of €120 per night. Drivers, carrying everything from perishables to industrial goods, found themselves hostages of a geopolitical standoff. The Lithuanian Carriers Association estimated losses at a staggering €5 million per week, millions of which were funneled directly into the regime’s coffers via these forced parking fees.

Refusing to be treated as collateral damage, Lithuanian transport companies launched fierce protests outside the parliament in Vilnius. The government’s response was cold — officials publicly stated that haulers "had only themselves to blame" for continuing to conduct business involving Belarus. This sparked outrage, as many of these trucks were merely transiting through Belarus, not trading with it. Meanwhile, Minsk seized the propaganda initiative. State media broadcast images of Belarusian "volunteers" distributing humanitarian aid to the stranded drivers, framing them as victims of a "heartless" Lithuanian government.

Simultaneously, investigative reports revealed that these smuggling balloons had been crossing the border for years, likely with the tacit approval of Belarusian authorities given the sheer scale of the operation. In 2024 alone, 791 such balloons were recorded. In 2025, by the end of October, 546 meteorological balloons had been intercepted. And these are only the balloons that were captured — the Lithuanian Border Service claims there are likely two to three times more, and only a fraction were cought. As it turned out, the sudden “crisis” in October appeared to be driven less by a new hybrid attack tactic of the regime and more by a shift in wind direction that drifted the balloons directly into airport flight paths.

Bowing to domestic pressure and the economic toll, Lithuania reopened the border ahead of schedule on November 19, officially citing a decrease in balloon activity — a claim immediately undermined when balloons halted airport traffic again the very next day. Officially, the border was closed until November 30 with a possible extension.

However, surprisingly, the reopening did not free up the trucks. Lukashenka, realizing he held 1,818 diplomatic "trump cards," refused to let them leave. He pivoted to coercive diplomacy, demanding high-level bilateral talks between the foreign ministries to "settle the situation."

The standoff has now dragged on for months. While Lithuanian carriers prepare lawsuits against their own government for inaction, the Prime Minister insists that legal claims should be directed at Minsk. The regime has since raised the stakes, threatening to confiscate the trucks and issuing a laundry list of demands — the return of Belarusian fire trucks bound for Zimbabwe (seized in Klaipeda due to sanctions), the normalization of the sanctioned "Belorus" sanatorium in Druskininkai, and compensation for frozen assets in the Klaipeda port. In response, Lithuania initiated new sanctions package, that is being prepared now by the EU to counter this "hybrid attack." Meanwhile, Lithuania is also negotiating with US representatives to designate the balloon incursions as acts of terrorism and discussing the confiscation and liquidation of Belarusian assets, such as "Belorus" sanatorium in Druskininkai, to compensate the haulers. The situation remains tense and unresolved.

Few have forgotten the international scandal surrounding the state-sponsored hijacking of the Ryanair Boeing 737 on May 23, 2021. The flight, bound for Vilnius from Athens, was forced down in Minsk by Belarusian authorities, leading to the immediate arrest of two passengers — Raman Pratasevich, a prominent opposition figure and editor-in-chief of the biggest Belarusian independent media outlet NEXTA, and his girlfriend, Russian citizen Sofia Sapega, who administered the "Black Book of Belarus," a channel doxxing security officers involved in the brutal crackdown on the 2020 protests.

Following their detention, their paths diverged sharply. Sapega was sentenced to six years in a penal colony but was pardoned by Lukashenka in 2023. She was subsequently handed over to a Russian delegation led by the Governor of the Primorsky Krai and returned to Russia. Protasevich, however, faced a much more convoluted and public disintegration.

Opting to strike a deal with the regime, Protasevich appeared in numerous interviews on state propaganda channels, leaking vast amounts of sensitive data regarding his former colleagues in exile. He effectively became a puppet of the state, actively utilized as a tool to smear the reputation of the democratic opposition abroad. Yet, this compliance initially seemed to offer him little protection. Like a discarded toy, he was sentenced on May 3, 2023, to eight years in a penal colony. Mere weeks later, on May 22, news broke of his pardon. "The day has finally come when my unpleasant story is finally over," Protasevich remarked at the time. He could not have been more wrong.

His ordeal was far from over — it had simply entered a new phase. For years, Protasevich lived as a pariah in his own country, unemployable and shunned by society. During this limbo, the regime continued to exploit him, sending him into penal colonies to persuade political prisoners to write petitions for pardons. He organized meetings with well-known inmates, extolling the "humane" conditions of Belarusian prisons and praising the dictator's leadership. In one particularly servile interview, he famously described Lukashenka as "a man with balls of steel" — a literal quote that underscored the depth of his submission.

Despite the humiliation and total capitulation, he remained an outcast with no prospects. Then, in 2025, the narrative took a truly Orwellian turn. Lukashenka publicly claimed that Protasevich had, in fact, been a Belarusian intelligence agent working undercover the entire time. The dictator asserted that the dramatic arrest operation had been unnecessary "theater," a claim Protasevich, naturally, was quick to corroborate.

Following this revisionist twist, Protasevich’s fortunes abruptly reversed. He was rewarded with a coveted position as a television host on STV, one of the state’s primary propaganda mouthpieces. He now anchors his own program, “Without Cover”, where he regularly disseminates "insider information" about "hostile" European nations. His debut episode, covering the fire at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania, became a sensation — primarily for the Belarusian democratic movement, which watched in shock. It served as a grim testament to the new reality — a stark illustration of how quickly a former symbol of freedom can be broken, remolded, and fully integrated into the very machinery of repression he once fought against.

Despite the consolidation of the regime’s power, the relentless intensification of repression, and the deepening integration into Russia’s war machine, 2025 emerged as a year of profound significance for the Belarusian people.

While the regime secured several diplomatic victories and lifting of key sanctions, the year was defined for thousands of families and the broader democratic movement by a rare and radiant moment of hope — the release of political prisoners. After half a decade of unyielding state pressure and systemic isolation, the freeing of these individuals provided a collective breath of relief. It served as a powerful, living reminder that even within the most tightly sealed systems, the light at the end of the tunnel has not been extinguished.

The year certainly delivered victories to the regime, some of which are structurally significant and may alter the geopolitical landscape for years to come. Yet, the resilience of the Belarusian spirit remains the most unpredictable variable in this equation. The joy of reunions and the return of once-silenced leaders has reinforced a fundamental truth that has been hardened by five years of struggle — there is no diplomatic concession or economic windfall that can outweigh the value of a human life.

We wish you freedom and peace in 2026 — for in the end, nothing is more valuable. Long live Belarus and Slava Ukraini!

#FreeThemAll #StandwithBelarus #StandwithUkraine