From Occupation to Sovereignty? Austria 1955 and Ukraine Today

After the end of the Second World War, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-use of force became core principles of international relations rooted in the Charter of the United Nations. Although never flawless and frequently violated, this framework is under existential challenge today. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues, clearly against international law and undermining the norm against territorial conquest. At the same time, the new administration in the White House has made troubling signals to "strike a deal" for the sake of peace, one that could pressure Ukraine to compromise its sovereignty, cede parts of its territories, and accept limitations on its choice of defence alliances. In this context, can Austria's 1955 experience of regaining sovereignty after a decade of occupation offer any insights into Ukraine's quest for peace, security and independence?

This article brings together historical, legal, and geopolitical perspectives in order to explore what Austria's State Treaty, just 70 years after its signing, can – and cannot – teach the European public and politicians about Ukrainian struggle for sovereignty today. It is based on a panel discussion at the Dialogbüro Vienna on June 3 2025, with Olga Malashkina, PhD candidate in history at the University of Vienna and former tour guide at the GULAG History Museum in Moscow; Dr. Stefan Meister, Head of the Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia at the German Society for Foreign Politics (DGAP) in Berlin; and Dr. Stephan Wendehorst, Senior Scientist at the Department of Legal and Constitutional History at the University of Vienna.

The conversation, moderated by the director of the Dialogbüro, Stefan Melle, started with a historical overview by Olga Malashkina, and footage of the signing the treaty on May 15, 1955. The speaker suggested that after the collapse of an Empire, the emerging states have a tendency to gravitate towards a larger entity, which is what happened to Austria after 1918 too. As the House of Habsburg rule came to an end and its multi-ethnic empire vanished overnight, the Austrians found themselves alone, and in search of an identity. Wanting to join Germany, yet, denied by the victorious Entente, it eventually was annexed by Nazis in 1938 (the so-called "Anschluss"). Thus, Österreich lost its sovereignty, was turned into the German province of Ostmark, while parts of its society were complicit in – and even participated in – the crimes of the Nazi regime and the Holocaust. However, in 1945, Allied powers defeated Germany, liberated the “Reich” and partitioned Austria into four occupation zones. Austria was considered a "victim" of aggression, which allowed it to negotiate a State Treaty ten years later rather than a punitive peace settlement.

Key elements of the State Treaty included restoring Austria’s 1920 constitution, reintroducing the Schilling as its currency, and explicitly requiring the withdrawal of all Allied troops "without further delay". Although formal neutrality was not written into the original text, Austria’s parliament enacted it soon afterward, making it the pillar of Austrian statehood. The Treaty reaffirmed Austria’s pre-Anschluss borders as of January 1, 1938, as well as enshrined minority rights; Slovene and Croatian populations in Carinthia and Burgenland were granted language rights in schools, courts, and official signage.

Why did negotiations drag on for ten years? Malashkina noted that the Soviet Union sought reparations from Austrian territory where former German assets remained. In fact, until Stalin's death in March 1953, the Soviets showed no real willingness to compromise. Only after that did the Kremlin "winked at" Austria – responding to Austrian envoys who asked the Soviet leadership to prove it was "not collective Stalin”, rather a different, post-Stalin regime. So the treaty was signed in May 1955 and by October all Allied troops had departed, leaving Austria an independent, and soon thereafter, constitutionally neutral, and despite the imposed conditions, sovereign state.

If Austria's experience shows how a modern state can reclaim sovereignty through treaty negotiation, it also raises the question: what does "sovereignty" actually mean under international law? Stephan Wendehorst, an expert on international law and its history, noted that there is a widespread misconception that sovereignty is absolute and indivisible, often linked to the legacy – or myth – of the Peace of Westphalia, which ended in 1648 the Thirty Years' War. In reality, he argued, sovereignty is not a fixed or clearly defined concept in international law. It has evolved over time and remains contested. Since the late 18th century, the sovereign state has, indeed, become the standard form of international legal personality, understood as a unit that possesses rights but also obligations. To qualify as a state under customary international law, a polity typically must satisfy several criteria: a defined territory, a permanent population, a functioning government, and the capacity to conduct foreign relations. The Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen added a fifth requirement, a formal constitution, arguing that without one, a polity cannot attain full international-legal personality.

However, "sovereignty" itself is not explicitly defined, neither in the United Nations Charter nor in customary international law. Article 2(1) of the UN Charter speaks of "the sovereign equality of all its Members," but does not specify what "sovereignty" entails, although it does mention political independence, autonomy, and territorial integrity. In practice, states can – and often do –cede parts of their sovereignty voluntarily, as seen in the European Union, where member states have pooled competencies in trade, currency, and judicial matters. Historically, even sub-state entities such as the Cossack Hetmanate and the Crimean Tatars on the territory of modern-day Ukraine played recognised roles under early modern international law. A good illustration of this is the 1658 Treaty of Hadiach, which attempted to admit the Cossack Hetmanate as a "third constituent" in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

When it comes to the current situation in Ukraine, Stephan Wendehorst stresses a crucial distinction: in 1955, Austria did not "give up" sovereignty in order to preserve a portion of it; rather, sovereignty was entirely withheld from Austria as allied powers, including the Soviet Union, held full sovereign control until the Treaty went into effect. That historical fact means that Soviet demands were legitimate in the sense that the USSR, together with the US, UK and France, exercised joint sovereignty over Austria, which had been part of the Nazi regime and its atrocities between 1938 and 1945. By contrast, modern Russia has no lawful claim over Ukraine under current international law, aside from the dubious 2010 Black Sea Fleet basing agreement for Sevastopol. To be clear, a post-war treaty could theoretically include neutrality or even territorial concessions, but only if Ukraine itself agrees voluntarily to them. That is the vital distinction. The Austrian analogy is thus legally misleading: Austria's sovereignty was restored following an occupation, which resulted from its participation in the crimes of the Third Reich; whereas only parts of Ukrainian territories have been under occupation and that due to Russian aggression. Ukraine remains a fully independent and internationally recognised state, with legal sovereignty affirmed since 1991 and further reaffirmed bilaterally in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum including by Russia. Hence, Ukraine, as a state, is not under foreign occupation in legal terms, and Russia holds no lawful authority to impose or demand any conditions.

From a geopolitical standpoint, Austria's journey was shaped by very specific historical and diplomatic circumstances. By contrast, as put by Stefan Meister from DGAP, Ukraine's situation looks fundamentally different. Russia today resembles a declining imperial power that refuses to forfeit control over its former territories. Ukraine's Orange Revolution (2004) and Euromaidan (2014) reflected its desire to distance itself from Russian influence and integrate with Western institutions – moves that the regime in Moscow view as existential threats to its imperial ambitions. Putin personally and his circle frequently question Ukraine's right to statehood, insisting that "Ukraine is not a real nation", but "in fact part of the Russian one". In that sense, Stefan Meister stated, Russia's war on Ukraine is not only about territory, domination and security claims, but also about denying Ukraine's legitimacy as an independent, sovereign actor in principle.

Moreover, Ukraine cannot rely on the kind of guarantees that Austria enjoyed, Meister argues, and neutrality is simply not a viable option for Ukraine. In 1994, Kyiv gave up the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal under the Budapest Memorandum in exchange for security assurances from the U.S., U.K., and Russia. Yet when Russia invaded Crimea in 2014 and launched a full-scale invasion in 2022, those assurances proved hollow. Austria's path to neutrality in 1955 was grounded in a broadly shared consensus between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Ukraine today, by contrast, is denied even the recognition of statehood by Russia.

What matters now is not only ending the war but also ensuring that such an invasion cannot happen again. Ukrainian leaders have repeatedly made clear that they will not accept neutrality under Russian conditions, because in practice, neutrality would mean continued Russian influence, control, and even subjugation. Ukraine's official peace formula demands the restoration of its borders to their pre-2014 status, the full withdrawal of Russian forces from occupied territories, and binding international security guarantees – goals that can only be realised through NATO membership, according to Dr. Meister.

Every responsible politician, expert, and publicist should underline that any suggestion for Ukraine to cede large portions of its territory and abandon its freedom to choose alliances as a quid pro quo for peace could be a mere capitulation, which would both violate Ukraine's fundamental rights and set a dangerous precedent in international law.

Dr. Wendehorst noted that the current situation around Russia and Ukraine is reminiscent of the partition of Poland in the eighteenth century and the League of Nations paralysis in the 1930s, nevertheless insisted that international law has not, yet, entirely collapsed. Furthermore, the speaker suggested that even if senior Russian officials are not brought before the International Criminal Court in The Hague, it is important to record the atrocities and war crimes – not only for the sake of justice but to also know the moral cost of the possible "deal". Finally, whether international law continues to be relevant largely depends on the outcomes of Ukraine's resolve to keep fighting and on its partners to support it.

In 2025, as Russia's invasion of Ukraine continues and Western unity shows visible cracks, the lessons of Austria in 1955 remain instructive although ultimately limited. Austria's restoration of sovereignty was made possible by a rare consensus in the early post-Stalin era. Ukraine, by contrast, is not restoring sovereignty – it is defending it. Russia has no legitimate claims over Ukrainian territory or statehood, yet it continues to wage war against its very existence. If Austria's experience offers any hope, it is that even small states can secure independence and sovereignty, albeit its comparison with modern-day Ukraine, which struggles to preserve it in the face of a revisionist neighbour, may not be particularly apt.